SMU Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 4

Article 8

January 1969

Accountants' Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations: The
Taxpayer's Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Raymond L. Dahlberg

Recommended Citation
Raymond L. Dahlberg, Note, Accountants' Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations: The Taxpayer's
Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 23 SW L.J. 728 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol23/iss4/8

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information,
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

NOTES
Accountants' Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations:
The Taxpayer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Zakutansky, a certified public accountant, possessed workpapers which
he had formulated as an aid in the preparation of taxpayer's income tax
returns. Pursuant to an investigation of taxpayer's returns, Internal Rev-

enue Service special agents served the accountant with a subpoena duces
tecum to produce the workpapers.' The accountant refused, and thereafter
turned the workpapers over to the taxpayer. Subsequently, administrative
summonses were issued to both the accountant and taxpayer for the production of the papers. The accountant was unable to comply because he
no longer possessed them and the taxpayer refused under a claim of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The government
filed a petition to enforce the summonses against both the accountant and
the taxpayer.' The district court ordered the production of the accountant's
workpapers,' and the taxpayer appealed. Held, affirmed: Where the taxpayer does not own the workpapers or hold them in his rightful and in-

definite possession, he is not entitled to withhold them under a claim of
privilege. United States v. Zakautansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
I. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
OF WORKPAPERS

IN PRODUCTION

The compulsory production of incriminating books and papers is not
significantly different from compelling a man to be a witness against himself.4 Under the doctrine of McCarthy v. Arndstein' a taxpayer can invoke
his fifth amendment privilege if it is likely that criminal charges may be
brought against him as a result of the production of his papers or records.'
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7602 provides: "For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return . . . the secretary or his delegate is authorized-(1) To examine any books, papers,
records, or other data which may be relevant to such inquiry ......
'Id. § 7604(a) provides: "If any person is summoned under the internal revenue law to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district
court . . . shall have jurisdiction to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books,
papers, records, or other data."
5 7604(b) provides:
Whenever any person summoned under section . . . 7602 neglects or refuses to obey
such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data . . . the secretary
• . . may apply to the judge of the district court. It shall be the duty of the
judge . . . to hear the application . . . and upon such hearing . . . to make such
order as he shall deem proper . . . to enforce obedience to the requirements of the
summons and to punish such person for his default or disobedience.
'United States v. Zakutansky, 278 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The privilege against self-incrimination is not
the only means by which a taxpayer can frustrate the government's quest for production (e.g.,
the fourth amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the attorney-client
or accountant-client communication privilege). See generally Cohen, Accountants' Workpapers in
Federal Tax Investigations, 21 TAx L. REV. 183 (1965).
2266 U.S. 34 (1921).
' The application of the McCarthy principle in an administrative proceeding by the Internal
Revenue Service to enforce a summons rests upon an unstable foundation because of the landmark
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The real enigma for the courts has been an interpretation of the McCarthy
rule as to who may invoke the privilege. The guiding light has been United
States v. White' where the Supreme Court, by way of dictum, said "the
papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege or at least in his possession in a
purely personal capacity."' While "in a purely personal capacity" has been
misinterpreted by some of the federal courts,9 the misinterpreters have recognized that the privilege does not rest on any narrow concept of ownership."8 In re House" became the first federal case to apply the White test
to a tax fraud investigation in holding that a taxpayer could claim the
privilege against self-incrimination when he held accountant's workpapers
in his "rightful and indefinite possession." Although the rightful and indefinite possession test was not necessary to uphold the taxpayer's claim in
House, that test has been controlling in other situations." Conversely, in
fact situations substantially identical to those of House, other federal
courts have refused to follow the rightful and indefinite possession test
and have declared ownership to be a prerequisite to claiming the privilege."
Thus, the federal courts cannot agree whether rightful and indefinite possession or ownership14 should be the basis for the taxpayer's privilege against

self-incrimination.
Those courts which have recognized ownership of workpapers as one of
the tests for claiming the privilege have relied primarily on United States
v. White." However, this position is weakened by Supreme Court decisions
holding that the owner of documents may not rely on a claim of privilege
once he has lost possession, 1 even though the documents were stolen.' The
case of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). Shapiro established the "required records"
exception to the fifth amendment privilege when the Supreme Court held that an individual under
a claim of the fifth amendment privilege had no right to withhold records which the laws required him to keep. None of the federal courts have held that accountants' workpapers fall within
the required records exception of Shapiro, and the Fifth Circuit, when presented with the opportunity to do so, chose to remain silent on the matter. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
7322 U.S. 694 (1944).
8
Id. at 699.
'In Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963), the court, citing White, stated
that an attorney could not claim a taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination because the
privilege had long been characterized as "personal." Accord, United States v. Boccuto, 175 F.
Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959). This interpretation of White has received criticism from the Ninth
Circuit. "It appears to us that the Supreme Court . . . used the term 'personal' in a sense of
'natural individual,' and the term 'representative' in the sense of 'representative of a non-privileged
organization.'" United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1963).
' United States v. Cohen, 250 F. Supp. 472 (D. Nev. 1965); Hughes v. Foster, 16 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 5121 (W.D.Tex. 1965); In re Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re
House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
11 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). The district court found that the accountant and taxpayer had made an express agreement to transfer title to the papers to the taxpayer when the
taxpayer requested the accountant to turn the workpapers over to his attorney.
"United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Foster, 16 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 5121 (W.D. Tex. 1965).
1
SBouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F.
Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959).
" Ownership is the "collection of rights to use and enjoy property, including right to transmit
it to others." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Is322 U.S. 694 (1944). See also text accompanying notes 7-8 sura.
'"Perlman
v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457
(1913).
t
' Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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fifth amendment privilege protects against self-incrimination; it does not
prevent incrimination itself. Mr. Justice Holmes in Johnson v. United
States"8 stated: "A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but
not from its production. . . . If the documentary confession comes to a
third hand alio intuitu . . . the use of it in court does not compel the defendant to be a witness against himself."'" Possession seems to be the very
foundation of the privilege, because absent a possessory interest, the taxpayer is not producing the evidence.
II.

UNITED STATES V. ZAKUTANSKY

The Seventh Circuit in Zakutansky further confuses the body of substantive law in the area of accountants' workpapers in tax fraud investigations. Although the factual situation is unique, the decision is significant
only in that it reinforces the conclusion that the federal courts cannot
develop a workable body of law concerning the taxpayer's privilege under
the fifth amendment.
In Zakutansky the court decided that the taxpayer could withhold the
papers if he owned them or held them in his rightful and indefinite possession. This result is in line with the decisions of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits," and opposed to those of the Third and Eighth Circuits."' But in
deciding whether or not possession or ownership is the proper test as opposed to legal title, the Seventh Circuit improperly ignored constitutional
law.
An ownership or rightful indefinite possession test will produce the
proper result under the Johnson rule when the taxpayer has possession of
the workpapers. But this test as used in Zakutansky implies that ownership without possession will support the privilege, and under the above
precedents the issue of ownership should be irrelevant in determining
whether or not the taxpayer can benefit by invoking the privilege." Possession should be the only prerequisite for claiming the privilege. But why
must possession be "rightful and indefinite?" What if the possession is
wrongful? If the government seeks production of workpapers from a
taxpayer who has stolen them from his accountant, the government's
right to the workpapers is no greater than that of the taxpayer. In such an
instance, ordering production would be no less self-incriminating to the
taxpayer than if his possession were "rightful.""2 However, the privilege
12228 U.S. 457 (1913).

"Id.

at 458-59.

2United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Foster, 16 Am. Fed. Tax

R.2d 5121 (W.D.Tex. 1965).
" Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Boccuto, 175
F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959).
"2 The Ninth Circuit has held that ownership of accountants' workpapers is not the proper
test to be applied because ownership without possession cannot be used to claim the privilege.
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,
41 (1924).
"2Judge Learned Hand stated in In re Grant, 198 F. 708, 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1912), aff'd,

227 U.S. 74 (1913):
[S]uppose that A., knowing that B. has papers which would incriminate him,
gets wrongful possession of them from B., whom they do not incriminate. If B.
is content, and leaves A. in possession, I do not understand that it would be any

1969]

NOTES

against self-incrimination does not "relieve one from compliance with
the substantive obligation to surrender property [to the owner]." 24 Hence,
a taxpayer could not wrongfully withhold incriminating workpapers from
their owner (the accountant) and thereby prevent the owner from turning them over to the government." But the privilege should operate so as
to protect a possessor from surrendering documents to anyone but the
legal owner.
Although the decision in Zakutansky can be criticized for adopting the
"ownership or rightful and indefinite possession" test, the result is equitable.
The critical fact for the court is that when the summons was served on
the accountant, he possessed the workpapers. The court reasoned that because the summons was served prior to a transfer of possession of the
workpapers, the accountant had a moral, if not legal, obligation to surrender them. Regardless of any independent moral duty found by the
court, the legal duty arising from statutory authority seems sufficient to
give the government some interest in the workpapers.' Nevertheless, with
or without any such governmental interest, the production of the workpapers in Zakutansky resulted in compulsory self-incrimination to the taxpayer. However, in this instance public policy required that the privilege
give way to the exercise of a legitimate governmental investigation. To
allow the taxpayer in Zakutansky to withhold the workpapers would effectively render meaningless the authority of the Internal Revenue Service
to issue a subpoena."
III. CONCLUSION
The increasing employment of criminal sanctions by the Internal Revenue Service to police our self-assessment income tax system demands that
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in this area be unianswer whatever to A. to say: 'You cannot keep these back, because you came by
them wrongfully, or at least you have no right to them now.' All the law considers
is whether A. has possession in fact, and whether the documents actually will tend
to incriminate him. To get them in evidence the law would have to force him to
bring them out of a possession which is good enough against anyone but B. Certainly, I can find nothing in the books which suggests such a distinction, and it
contradicts the whole history of the matter.
24 Justice Brandeis in McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924).
25In United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967), an accountant had turned over
workpapers to the taxpayer and had told revenue agents that he had no property interest in the
workpapers. Thereafter, the accountant demanded the workpapers from the taxpayer so that he
could comply with the administrative summons. Without determining the ownership of the workpapers, the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayer did not have to produce them. Although the
court mentions that wrongful possession may be sufficient to claim the privilege, they reasoned that
the taxpayer's possession was rightful, because the accountant denied ownership of the papers and
demanded their return only so he could turn them over to the government.
26 See note 1 supra.
'7United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950):
[P]ersons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum
duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public interest in the
orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. A subpoena has never been
treated as an invitation to a game of hare and hounds, in which the witness must
testify only if cornered at the end of the chase. If that were the case, then, indeed,
the great power of testimonial compulsion, so necessary to the effective functioning of
courts and legislatures, would be a nullity. We have often iterated the importance
of thispublic duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government
is bound to perform when properly summoned.
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formly and adequately defined. Unfortunately, it is not. Zakutansky allows the privilege when the taxpayer owns the workpapers or holds them in
his rightful and indefinite possession. Other than implying that wrongful
possession is insufficient, the court does not define possession which is
"rightful and indefinite." Historically, under the constitutional precedents
of the early twentieth century the Seventh Circuit's formulation is incorrect. The privilege should be allowed when the taxpayer has bare possession of workpapers, whether it be rightful or wrongful, definite or indefinite. Ownership without possession is not a proper criteria because the
privilege guards against self-incrimination and not against incrimination
by others.
The Supreme Court precedents underlying the rationale of the bare
possession test were developed before the current emphasis on due process.
The Court's recent liberalization of constitutional rights does support an
argument that under "due process" the High Court might extend the
fifth amendment privilege to a taxpayer who owned workpapers but did
not have possession of them. Such an extension, however, would seem unwarranted. The Court has clearly stated that the privilege only arises when
compulsion exists. " In addition, within the last five years the Court has
twice held that the fourth amendment privilege against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not protect an individual from his misplaced
trust in another person." How can it be said that the fifth amendment
protects a person from voluntarily surrendering incriminating papers to
another? Any decision allowing a taxpayer to protect workpapers under
the fifth amendment when he has ownership without possession seems far
removed from compulsory self-incrimination.
In the enforcement of the subpoena duces tecum there is some authority to the effect that a taxpayer should be given greater protective rights
than those afforded by the Constitution and the usual rules of evidence."
But whether the privilege against self-incrimination should be expanded
beyond its current bounds is doubtful. In criminal proceedings the search
for truth continues to be a forceful policy argument against enlarging

the scope of constitutional protection. Those exemplary historical exemptions which often frustrated this policy need not be expanded to shield a

taxpayer who is under no actual compulsion.
Raymond L. Dahlberg

SHoffa v. United States, 38 U.S. 293 (1966).
" Id.; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
S Wigmore argues that the specialization required for practicing before administrative agencies
should create communication privileges (e.g., an accountant-client communication privilege). See
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2300(a) (rev. ed. 1961).

